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Abstract—Federated learning has become prevalent in medical diagnosis due to its effectiveness in training a federated model among
multiple health institutions (i.e., Data Islands (DIs)). However, increasingly massive DI-level poisoning attacks have shed light on a
vulnerability in federated learning, which inject poisoned data into certain DIs to corrupt the availability of the federated model. Previous
works on federated learning have been inadequate in ensuring the privacy of DIs and the availability of the final federated model. In this
paper, we design a secure federated learning mechanism with multiple keys to prevent DI-level poisoning attacks for medical diagnosis,
called SFPA. Concretely, SFPA provides privacy-preserving random forest-based federated learning by using the multi-key secure
computation, which guarantees the confidentiality of DI-related information. Meanwhile, a secure defense strategy over encrypted
locally-submitted models is proposed to defense DI-level poisoning attacks. Finally, our formal security analysis and empirical tests on
a public cloud platform demonstrate the security and efficiency of SFPA as well as its capability of resisting DI-level poisoning attacks.
Index Terms—Federated learning, medical diagnosis, poisoning attacks, secure computation, secure defense.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
WITH the exponential growth of demands for medicaldiagnosis, machine learning has been ubiquitously
used to drive critical decisions in telemedicine diagnosis [1],
[2], [3]. One depressing situation in training a diagnosis
model arises as relatively limited medical data are gener-
ated and collected in a single health organization [4]. Most
of medical data (i.e., non-independent and identically dis-
tributed (non-i.i.d.) data [5]) are distributed among multiple
institutions in the form of “Data Island” (DI). The training
over local data will incur the underfitting in the predictive
model as the training data is insufficient, thereby leading to
incorrect medical diagnosis.
To embrace the advantages (e.g., cost savings, access
feasibility) of cloud computing, patients prefer to remotely
transfer medical data for diagnosis at any time, as con-
venient as “put a doctor into pockets”, which is figura-
tively described as pocket diagnosis. To improve a more
accurate diagnosis model, all patients can outsource their
individually-collected medical data to a cloud server, but
will compromise the data privacy as the medical data
generally contain much sensitive information such as age,
sex and family heredity history. It is urgently required for
privacy protection [6], [7], [8], [9]. With the ever-increasing
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awareness of data privacy [10], [11], [12], European Union
enforced the GDPR [13] to safeguard data security without
roughly gathering all data from multiple DIs for traditional
machine learning.
Motivated by privacy concerns of distributed learning
in the cloud, the federated learning [14], [15], [16], [17] has
been proposed as an efficient method to train a federated
model by aggregating outsourced local models trained on
multiple DIs in a privacy-preserving way. Since local models
contain sensitive information of DIs, each DI encrypts indi-
vidual local model under his/her key before outsourcing
it to the cloud [18]. Existing federated learning schemes
are generally deployed in the single key setting [19], [20],
[14], in which all DIs use the same key pair to respectively
encrypt their models. However, if one DI is comprised by
an adversary, it will lead to the privacy leakage in the
pocket diagnosis. The key agreement [21] avoids this kind
of privacy leakage by creating a shared key between any
two DIs, but will incur high communication overheads as
the number of DIs increases. The first challenge is how to avoid
the security threat and unnecessary overhead in pocket diagnosis
under the single-key scenario.
Thus, it is necessary to consider a more suitable model
for secure computation to achieve the tradeoff between the
availability and security of federated learning. Meanwhile,
to provide accurate diagnosis services, an interpretable di-
agnosis model is required that can produce insights about
the causes of decisions [22], [23].
It is also worth mentioning the corruption of training
data in pocket diagnosis. Recently, the attack of inject-
ing carefully crafted adversarial samples into the training
dataset, so-called poisoning attack [24], [25], [26], has been
proposed. The attacker aims to lead classification errors dur-
ing the diagnosis time. Generally speaking, a wrong medical
diagnosis may lead to a loss of trust of users and life-
threatening consequences [27]. The federated learning can
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2Fig. 1: Overview of DI-level poisoning attack.
protect the privacy of local models, but it cannot guarantee
that none of DIs are malicious [28], [29]. Thus, the way may
lead to DI-level poisoning attacks [30]. Fig. 1 gives a high-
level overview of the DI-level poisoning attack in the pocket
diagnosis, the attacker injects poisoned data into certain
DI (i.e., DI2) to poison the federated model. If the attack
succeeds without timely defense, the poisoned federated
model will return a wrong diagnosis result for the submitted
request. To eliminate the above-mentioned hazards, a range
of defense countermeasures have been designed to prevent
poisoning attacks. However, prior works [31], [32], [33] on
poisoning attacks focus on implementing over local data
stored in a single DI, but these schemes are futile for DI-level
poisoning attacks as intermediate parameters will reveal
local data privacy. The second challenge is how to protect the
training accuracy of pocket diagnosis under the adversarial setting
of poisoning attacks.
Due to the shortcomings (i.e., limitations of local data
access and the lack of privacy protection) of previous de-
fense strategies, existing defense methods are not suitable
for federated learning. To guarantee privacy and availability
of the federated learning, it is urgent to propose a secure
defense countermeasure against DI-level poisoning attacks
in the federated learning.
1.1 Our Contributions
To address above challenges, in this paper we present a
Secure Federated learning against DI-level Poisoning Attack
for the pocket diagnosis under multiple keys, which is
termed as SFPA. Our main contributions are summarized
as follows.
• Secure Federated Learning with Multiple Keys: To pre-
vent the security threat caused by the leakage of a
single key, SFPA proposes a privacy-preserving fed-
erated learning framework based on multi-key com-
putation. The framework designs a random forest-
based federated diagnosis model over multiple DIs,
which can be executed on a single cloud server to
avoid the collusion of multi-server model.
• Secure Defense Countermeasure: To defense DI-level
poisoning attacks, SFPA proposes a secure and ef-
fective defense countermeasure, which ensures the
privacy of DIs in the multi-key setting. The defense
approach based on trimmed optimization can resist
a range of DI-level poisoning attacks in the federated
learning.
• Privacy-preserving Pocket Diagnosis: To provide diag-
nosis services, SFPA designs th multi-key pocket di-
agnosis, which allows users to remotely send medical
requests via mobile devices and instantly obtain final
encrypted diagnosis results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 and Section 3 introduce related works and relevant
technology. In Section 4, we give a formal description of
the system model, threat model and design goals. Then,
we elaborate the construction of the SFPA framework in
Section 5, followed by the security analysis of SFPA system
in Section 6. Section 7 presents performance evaluation of
SFPA sysetm. Finally, we conclude this paper and discuss
its future work in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Previous studies on federated learning are based on the
confidentiality of locally-trained models, but do not take the
availability of a federated model in the adversarial world
into consideration. In order to solve existing problems,
we outline a brief review of previous studies on privacy-
preserving federated learning and defense countermeasures
against poisoning attacks, respectively.
2.1 Secure Computation with Federated Learning
The primitive of federated learning was first pointed out
by Google [34], which is used to train the federated model
over locally-trained models. Compared with the conven-
tional training methods, the federated learning provides the
privacy preservation by leveraging homomorphic encryp-
tion, and achieves the high efficiency with implementing
local training over plaintexts. After that, many federated
learning schemes were proposed to improve the efficiency
and security [19], [20]. McMahan et al. [19] designed a
secure aggregation algorithm based on Paillier cryptosystem
on deep networks. Wang et al. [20] proposed a federated
learning framework constructed by using the convolutional
neural network and a Paillier cryptosystem. However, these
schemes only support the single key setting. Once the
encrypted data are leaked or the communication channel
is compromised, it is easy to obtain the secret key to
decrypt the private data. To solve the dilemma, existing
works on traditional machine learning [35], [36], [10] were
proposed for privacy protections in the multi-key settings.
Liu et al. [35], [10] designed multi-key secure computation
protocols. Ma et al. [36] presented a privacy-preserving
Random Forest (RF) scheme for distributed learning, where
RF with the natures of interpretability and transparency
has been widely used in medical diagnosis. All the above
schemes [35], [36], [10] can protect data privacy with multi-
ple non-colluding cloud servers. Even if one cloud server is
corrupted, it still can guarantee data privacy. Unfortunately,
it is difficult to employ multiple non-colluding servers in the
real-world due to commercial competitions and conflicts of
interest.
There exists security problems in the single-key setting
and constraints of a strong assumption in the multi-key
setting. Therefore, it is necessary to propose a multi-key
federated learning scheme in the multiple DIs, which aims
to eliminate the collusion assumption of multi-server model
and guarantee multi-key secure computation.
32.2 Defense Countermeasures against Poisoning At-
tack
Practical poisoning attacks have been demonstrated in the
machine learning. To defense such attacks, an increasing
number of defense strategies have been presented. Klivans
et al. [31] first introduced a learning framework, which
removes the malicious data to avoid outliers by using a
clustering algorithm. The similar defense strategies were
suggested [29], [32], which prevent poisoned data in a
training dataset by minimizing the loss function in the
model. If the error rate of a training sample is higher than a
threshold, then the sample will be considered as an outlier.
However, as the real distribution of benign training data
is obviously unknown, it is extremely difficult to identify
all poisoned data. Instead of removing outliers from the
training data, a trimmed optimization is deployed to make
machine learning robust. Jagielski et al. [33] adopted a
trimmed loss function to select a subset of training data with
the lowest residuals relative to the training model, removing
data with large residuals to trim training data. The subset is
close to the benign training data which does not contribute
much to the poisoning attack. Wang et al. [37] proposed a
novel adversarial deep neural network model by selecting
a data subset to detect and mitigate poisoning attacks.
Aforementioned strategies can effectively defense poisoning
attacks in the regression learning and deep learning, but
are restricted with data poisoning in a single DI. Besides,
computational intermediate parameters of the defense pro-
cess may lead to privacy leakage. Unlike data poisoning on
traditional machine learning, the federated learning focuses
on the issue of model poisoning [30], resisting poisonous
local-models from certain malicious DIs. Considering both
security and availability of pocket diagnosis, it is urgent
to propose a secure federated learning scheme for pocket
diagnosis, which supports the multi-key setting and resists
DI-level poisoning attacks.
TABLE 1: Functionalities, securities and techniques in vari-
ous schemes: A comparative summary
Schemes [20] [21] [36] [33] [37] SFPA
Federated Learning ! ! % % % !
Secure Computation ! ! ! % % !
Server Single Multiple Dual — Single Single
Multi-key Setting % % ! % % !
Defense Strategy % % % ! ! !
Notes. “Single” and “Dual” represent the number of cloud servers, respec-
tively; “—” means that is not involved secure computation.
TABLE 1 summarizes the comparison between our SFPA
and previous schemes [20], [35], [36], [33] in terms of several
aspects (i.e., secure computation, multi-key setting, etc.). It
reveals that SFPA provides both secure federated learning in
the multi-key setting and defense against DI-level poisoning
attacks. Meanwhile, our SFPA avoids the collusion of the
multi-server model.
3 PERLIMINARY
This section describes the definition of random forest, two-
trapdoor public-key cryptosystem for multi-key decryp-
tion [10] and multi-key secure computation [35].
3.1 Random Forest
Random Forest (RF) is an ensemble learner with outstand-
ing interpretability, which consists of a series of Decision
Trees (DTs). Assume that a RF includes t DTs (i.e., rf =
{dt1, dt2, ..., dtt}), a label class is defined as (c0 = −1, c1 =
1)1. The final RF prediction result of a sample x is computed
as yˆ = 1t
∑t
i=1 dti(x). When the value yˆ ≥ 0, the prediction
is c1; otherwise, the prediction is c0. In a DT, the weight w
of a splitting node is the splitting value, the weight w of a
leaf node is the class label.
3.2 Multi-key Decryption Scheme
Here, we introduce the multi-key decryption scheme, which
consists of five algorithms.
• KeyGen: Given the security parameter ς , the public
key pk = (N, g) and secret key sk = λ are computed,
where the secret key sk can be randomly split into
secret shares sk(1) and sk(2).
• Encpk(m): Given a plaintext m, the encrypted data
[[m]] is computed with the public key pk.
• Decsk([[m]]): Given the ciphertext [[m]], the plaintext
m is decrypted with the secret key sk.
• SDecsk(i)([[m]]): Given the ciphertext [[m]], the de-
cryption share [[m]](i) = [[m]]sk
(i)
mod N2 is com-
puted with the corresponding secret share ski.
• WDec({[[m]](1), [[m]](2)}): Given the tuple of decryp-
tion shares {[[m]](1), [[m]](2)}, the plaintext m is de-
crypted.
3.3 Multi-Key Secure Computation
Here, we introduce the Secure Multiplication (SMUL), Secure
Comparison (SCOM), Secure Addition (SADD), Secure Trans-
formation (STRA) operations of multi-key secure computa-
tion. Given encrypted data under two different keys (i.e.,
pka, pkb), the computation result under the other public key
pk can be computed as follows:
• SMUL([[ma]]pka , [[mb]]pkb): It outputs the multiplica-
tion result [[ma ×mb]]pk.
• SCOM([[ma]]pka , [[mb]]pkb): It outputs the comparison
result res to show which number is bigger. If res =
0, ma ≥ mb; Otherwise, ma < mb.
• SADD([[ma]]pka , [[mb]]pkb): It outputs the sum [[ma +
mb]]pk.
• STRA([[m]]pka): It transforms [[m]]pka to [[m]]pk.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we define the system model, threat model
and design goals of SFPA, respectively.
4.1 System Model
As demonstrated in Fig. 2, our system model consists of
four entities: Key Generation Center (KGC), Cloud Platform
(CP), Data Island (DI) and Diagnosis User (DU). The con-
crete role of each entity is shown as follows:
1. Without loss of generality, here we only consider binary classifica-
tion.
4Fig. 2: System model
• Key generation center. KGC is in charge of generation,
distribution, and management of all keys in our
system.
• Data island. Each DI hosting distributed medical data
first trains local models on individual data, and then
encrypts local models by using the individual key
before sending them to CP. Without loss of general-
ity, the local training data of all DIs are considered
as non-i.i.d. distribution. Besides, each DI conducts
multi-key secure computation operations by cooper-
ating with CP.
• Cloud platform. CP owns unlimited storage space for
encrypted locally-trained models, and implements
the secure defense against DI-level poisoning attacks.
Then, benign local models are securely aggregated to
generate a federated model. Besides, CP can conduct
multi-key secure computation operations.
• Diagnosis user. DU first encrypts a diagnosis request
with his/her public key before submitting it to CP,
then decrypts the diagnosis result returned by CP.
Besides, DUs are involved with multi-key secure
computations that are executed with CP.
4.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume that KGC is trustable for
key management. DU, DI, and CP are considered as honset-
but curious entities, which honestly follow pre-defined pro-
tocols but are interested in deducing private information
from other entities. Besides, we assume that DI, CP, and DU
are not in collusion. According to the available information
and capabilities to an adversary, we consider two attack
models with different attack abilities:
• Privacy violation. The adversary can observe en-
crypted locally-trained models, intermediate calcu-
lation parameters, encrypted diagnosis requests and
returned results.
• Poisoning attack. Suppose the adversary can access
local training dataset Dtri hosted on certain DIs and
inject poisonous data to corrupt the locally-trained
models, eventually achieve the DI-level poisoning
attack on federated learning.
4.3 Design Goals
To achieve privacy-preserving federated learning and resist
DI-level poisoning attacks under the aforementioned ad-
versarial environment, our design must meet security and
accuracy requirements as follows.
• Security. SFPA should protect the confidentiality of
locally-trained models and the privacy of interme-
diate computational parameters on federated learn-
ing. Besides, the proposed defense countermeasure
against DI-level poisoning attacks should not re-
veal any private information. Finally, in the diagno-
sis phase, both DU’s submitted-requests and corre-
sponding diagnosis results should be only known to
DU.
• Accuracy. SFPA must guarantee the diagnosis accu-
racy of a federated model. Under the adversarial
environment, SFPA framework can resist DI-level
poisoning attacks, where a federated model is able
to make correct predictions for pocket diagnosis.
5 SFPA FRAMEWORK WITH MULTIPLE KEYS
Fig. 3: Overview of SFPA
Traditional federated learning schemes incur high com-
putation and storage burden on constructing a diagnosis
model, and even cannot resist poisoning attacks. In this
section, we first present a privacy-preserving RF-based fed-
erated learning framework in the ideal world to provide
an efficient and secure training method, then design a
secure defense countermeasure to resist DI-level poison-
ing attacks in the adversarial world. Finally, we securely
implement pocket diagnosis. The overview of SFPA is
shown in Fig. 3, there are four main processes: initialization
(Step 1© 2©), secure defense countermeasure (Step 3© 4©),
privacy-preserving RF-based federated learning (Step 5©),
and privacy-preserving pocket diagnosis (Step 6©- 8©). The
specified processes are defined as follows. Besides, some
notations used in SFPA framework are shown in TABLE 2.
5.1 Initialization
The initialization contains three phases: key distribution,
model building, and model encryption. The concrete process
is defined as follows.
KeyManagement: Assume that SFPA framework con-
tains n DIs. KGC first generates keys (pk, sk, sk(1), sk(2)),
(pkDIi , skDIi , sk
(1)
DIi , sk
(2)
DIi) and (pku, sku, sk
(1)
u , sk
(2)
u ), where
sk(1), sk(2) are corresponding secret shares of sk and
sk
(1)
DIi , sk
(2)
DIi are corresponding secret shares of skDIi (i =
1, 2, ..., n), and sk(1)u , sk
(2)
u are corresponding secret shares
of sku, respectively. Besides, we define pk = (N, g), pkDIi =
(N, gi) and pku = (N, gu). Then, KC distributes keys to CP,
DIs and DU, respectively. Concretely, details are shown in
Fig. 4.
5TABLE 2: Notation descriptions
Notations Descriptions
× Poisonous symbol
∗ Benign symbol
FM Federated model
{sk(1), sk(2)} Secret shares for CP
{sk(1)DI , sk(2)DI } Secret shares for a DI
{sk(1)u , sk(2)u }, sku Secret shares and secret key for DU
[[x]]
(1)
pk , [[x]]
(2)
pk Decryption shares for [[x]]pk
F = {f1, f2, ..., fκ} Feature set with the size of κ
[[Dval]]pk Encrypted validation dataset
Dtri Local training data belongs to i-th DI
Local∗ben Choose locally-encrypted RF models to construct FM
n∗ Number of benign data islands
n Total number of data islands
[[rf ]]pkDIi
Locally-encrypted model belongs to i-th DI
Local = {[[rf ]]pkDIi }
n
i=1 Locally-encrypted models
ModelBuild: As shown in Step 1©, the i-th DI locally
builds the RF model rfi over a local training dataset
Dtri , where the trained model rfi consists of ti trees,
rfi = {dt1, dt2, ..., dtti}.
ModelEnc: As shown in Step 2©, the locally-trained model
rfi will be encrypted by the public key pkDIi of the i-th DI,
and each tree dt ∈ rfi can be encrypted from the root until
the leaf node as
[[dt]]pkDIi = {[[wroot]]pkDIi , [[w1]]pkDIi , ..., [[wΓ]]pkDIi},
where w (including split value and feature index) is a tree
node’s parameter, root denotes the root node, and Γ denotes
the last node in a tree. Then, the i-th DI sends the encrypted
model [[rfi]]pkDIi to CP.
5.2 Privacy-preserving RF-based Federated Learning
In the ideal world, all DIs outsource encrypted locally-
trained RF models under multiple keys, where DIs own
mutually-different public keys pkDIi to protect DIs’ privacy
(see Fig. 5(a)). We propose a privacy-preserving federated
learning mechanism aiming at two targets: a) Construct-
ing an accurate federated model over multiple RF models
trained on DIs without accessing local data. b) Providing
privacy protection for the whole process.
After the Step 2©, locally-trained RF models are con-
tained in Local = {[[rfi]]pkDIi}ni=1 that are encrypted un-
der different keys. Once receiving Local, CP will construct
the federated model FM. Since Local is encapsulated with
mutually-different keys, it is necessary to aggregate Local
into FM under the same key pk for privacy preservations.
The concrete process is shown as follows:
SecureAggregation(Local) → FM: As shown in Step 5©,
given encrypted models Local, CP transforms ciphertexts
Local under different keys pkDIi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) into ci-
phertexts FM under the same public key pk based on
multi-key secure transformation (STRA). As the RF model
from the i-th DI consists of ti trees, namely [[rfi]]pkDIi ={[[dt1]]pkDIi , [[dt2]]pkDIi , ..., [[dtti ]]pkDIi}, CP will use the STRA to
transform each tree [[dt]] from the root node until leaf nodes
as [[w]]pk ← STRA([[w]]),2 where the weight [[w]] of certain
tree node will be transformed to [[w]]pk under the sample
public key pk = (N, g). Since STRA is required to run
2. For simplification, we denote [[x]]pkDIi as [[x]].
Fig. 4: Key distribution in SFPA.
over two parties, the i-th DI cooperates with CP to conduct
secure aggregation on a tree node, which is demonstrated
as follows:
• CP first chooses a random number r ← ZN to blind
[[w]] as [[w′]]← [[w]]·[[r]], then computes the decryption
share with [[w′]](1) ← SDec
sk
(1)
DI
([[w′]]), finally sends
both [[w′]] and [[w′]](1) to i-th DI.
• Then, the i-th DI first gets the decryption share
via [[w′]](2) ← SDec
sk
(2)
DI
([[w′]]), then runs w′ ←
WDec([[w′]](1), [[w′]](2)) to obtain the decryption w′,
finally returns [[w′]]pk ← Encpk(w′) to CP.
• Finally, CP removes the blinded random number r
via [[w]]pk ← [[w′]]pk · [[r]]pkN−1 to obtain the transfor-
mation result [[w]]pk.
In this way, each encrypted tree [[dt]]pkDIi can be trans-
formed into [[dt]]pk. Therefore, [[rf ]]pkDIi ∈ Local can be trans-
formed into [[rf ]]pk, and a federated model FM is obtained
via SecureAggregation(Local)→ FM.
5.3 Secure Defense Countermeasure
(a) The view of ideal world. (b) The view of adversarial world.
Fig. 5: Illustration of the comparison between ideal world
and adversarial world in the privacy-preserving federated
learning. There are nDIs, “Dtri” represents the training data
belonging to the i-th DI, which is poisoned.
Different from the ideal world, the attacker in the adver-
sarial world can inject poisonous data into DIs to launch a
DI-level poisoning attack for the corruption of a federated
model. Fig. 5(b) shows the view of adversarial world. Here,
we propose a secure defense countermeasure to resist the
DI-level poisoning attack without privacy leakage.
In the adversarial environment, we treat the attack as
white-box, the attacker can know the training data Dtr,
feature set F , learning algorithm H and even training
6parameters w belonging to DI×, the attacker’s knowledge
is described by
knowledge = {Dtr, F,H,w}. (1)
In addition, we define the DI-level poisoning attack as
a bilevel optimization problem under the white-box knowl-
edge assumption, as demonstrated in
argmaxD× L∗(D∗tr, w∗);
s.t. w∗ ∈ argminw L(Dtr ∪D×).
(2)
To poison the locally-trained model of a DI× to the
most extent, the outer optimization injects carefully crafted
poisoned data D× into a DI× to maximize a loss function
L∗ on an untainted training set D∗tr. The inner optimization
minimizes the loss function L on poisoned data Dtr ∪ D×
for local training.
We assume that the total number of DIs in the federated
learning is n and the number of malicious DIs injected by
the attacker is n× = α · n (α < 1). The attacker controls the
fixed fraction α of malicious DIs (i.e.,DI×). To withstand the
DI-level poisoning attack, the principle goal is to construct
a federated model FM with chosen Local∗ben from encrypted
local models Local, where Local∗ben contains all encrypted
RF models from benign DIs in the ideal case. However, in
the real world, it is difficult to pick all benign RF models
from Local.
To solve the problem, we use the trimmed loss function
to select Local∗ben with the lowest Mean Squared Error
(MSE). The smaller MSE is, the more accurate prediction
of RF outputs, where MSE is computed over encrypted
validation dataset [[Dval]]pk that are collected by CP from
benign DIs. As MSE contains sensitive information, we
compute MSE on an encrypted RF model [[rfi]]pkDIi over the
validation dataset [[Dval]]pk as [[MSErfi ]]pk.
To provide an efficient solution against the DI-level poi-
soning attack, we define the optimization problem in secure
defense:
min
n∗∑
i=1
[[MSErfi ]]pk s.t. [[rfi]]pkDIi ∈ Local∗ben, (3)
where
[[MSErfi ]]pk =
|Dval|∑
k=1
[[MSErfi,dk ]]pk,
s.t. [[dk]]pk ∈ [[Dval]]pk.
(4)
We design SecureMSE to securely compute the MSE
value [[MSErf,dk ]]pk over the encrypted RF model [[rf ]]pkDIi
and an encrypted sample [[dk]]pk ∈ Dval. The concrete
process is shown as follows.
SecureMSE([[rf ]]pkDIi , [[dk]]pk) → [[MSErf,dk ]]pk: At the Step
3©, given [[dk]]pk ∈ [[Dval]]pk, the encrypted RF model
[[rf ]]pkDIi ∈ Local returns the prediction [[yˆ]]pkDIi ←
SecurePrediction([[rf ]]pkDIi , [[dk]]pk). Note that the specific
process of prediction is shown in Section 5.4. After obtaining
the prediction [[yˆ]]pkDIi , [[MSErf,dk ]]pk is computed as
[[y − yˆ]]pk ← SADD([[y]]pk, [[yˆ]]N−1pkDIi ),
[[MSErf,dk ]]pk ← SMUL([[y − yˆ]]pk, [[y − yˆ]]pk),
(5)
where [[y]]pk is the ground-truth label of [[dk]]pk. Clearly, the
corresponding process of [[MSErf,dk
3]]pk is based on SADD
and SMUL, it needs cooperation between CP and the i-th DI.
Note that [[−y]]pk = [[y]]N−1pk is a homomorphic property [10].
Computed with SecureMSE, we can obtain encrypted
MSE values [[MSErfi ]]pk (i = 1, 2, ..., n) over a validation
dataset [[Dval]]pk. As shown in step 4©, we need to remove
poisonous models for secure defense, which can implement
the solution to the optimal problem in Eq. 3 and provide pri-
vacy guarantees at the same time. An outline of the specific
process can be found in Algorithm 1. CP adopts MSE as a
discriminator to select suitable local models and construct
Local∗ben. If MSErfi ≥ Θ, where [[Θ]]pk is upper bounder
set by the system, we consider the RF model [[rfi]]pkDIi is
poisonous and remove it; If MSErfi < Θ, we consider
that [[rfi]]pkDIi is benign. After selecting local models from
Local, we construct the final federated model with chosen
models Local∗ben. Although the subset Local
∗
ben still contains
the poisoned models, it is close to the benign models and
cannot corrupt the final federated model. Then, the chosen
encrypted models Local∗ben under different public keys can
be transformed to FM under the same public key pk via
SecureAggregation(Local∗ben)→ FM, where FM contains n∗
encrypted RF models. Remark that we recommend a default
value of Θ = 80 when the size of the validation dataset is
|Dval| = 100, and the upper bound [[Θ]]pk can be adjusted
according to the defense’s needs and the size of Dval.
Algorithm 1: Secure Defense
Input: The validation dataset Dval, the upper bound
[[Θ]]pk of MSE value, and a set of encrypted
locally-trained models Local = {[[rfi]]pki}ni=1.
Output: The federated model FM.
1 Initialize Local∗ben ← {};
2 for each RF model [[rfi]]pki ∈ Local do
3 for each data sample [[dk]]pk ∈ Dval do
4 [[MSErfi,dk ]]pk ← SecureMSE([[rfi]]pki , [[dk]]pk);
5 [[MSErfi ]]pk =
∑|Dval|
k=1 [[MSErfi,dk ]]pk;
6 Secure comparison SCOM([[MSErfi ]]pk, [[Θ]]pk);
7 if MSErfi < Θ then
8 Local∗ben ← Local∗ben ∪ [[rfi]]pki ;
9 Construct the federated model FM with Local∗ben
under multiple keys via
FM← SecureAggregation(Local∗ben);
10 return FM.
5.4 Privacy-preserving Pocket Diagnosis
In the pocket diagnosis, an authorized DU can submit
his/her symptom characteristics at any time and anywhere
for pocket diagnosis service. In the Step 6©, since symptom
characteristics contain DU’s privacy, each DU encrypts the
submitted characteristics {f1, f2, ...fκ} by using his/her
public key pku as [[req]]pku = {[[f1]]pku , [[f2]]pku , ..., [[fκ]]pku}.
Then, DU can require the diagnosis service from CP via
the submitted-request [[req]]pku . On receiving [[req]]pku , CP
will adopt the federated model FM to implement privacy-
preserving pocket diagnosis. Given FM under the public
key pk and the encrypted request [[req]]pku under DU’s
3. Note that MSErf,dk = (y − yˆ)2.
7Fig. 6: The structure of a tree.
public key pku, the multi-key secure computation involved
in SecurePrediction still needs to be executed between CP
and DU as the authorized DU holds the corresponding key
share sk(2). The details are shown as follows.
SecurePrediction([[rfi]]pki , [[req]]pku): At the step 7©, given
an encrypted request [[req]]pku submitted by an authorized
DU, the federated model FM = {[[rfi]]pk}n∗i=1 can make a
prediction on [[req]]pku . The prediction on each encrypted
tree [[dt]]pk ∈ FM is defined as [[dt]]pk([[req]]pku) that involves
two keys (i.e., pk and pku). Therefore, the process of pocket
diagnosis needs the cooperation between DU and CP for
multi-key secure comparison (SCOM). The specific process
demonstrates in Algorithm 2, where each encrypted tree
[[dt]]pk ∈ FM makes the prediction by retrieving the corre-
sponding label from the tree node until encountering a leaf
node.
Taking Fig. 6 as an example, once receiving an encrypted
request [[req]]pku = {[[f1]]pku , [[f2]]pku , ..., [[fκ]]pku}, the en-
crypted tree [[dt]]pk will implement prediction as follows:
[[dt]]pk first compares the tree root with [[req]]pku , as the root
is not a leaf, the feature index id = 1 and split value [[w1]]pk
contained in the weight are obtained, then secure com-
parison SCOM([[w1]]pk, [[f1]]pku) is called to compare [[w1]]pk
with the corresponding feature value [[f1]]pku ∈ [[req]]pku .
If f1 < w1, then [[req]]pku is compared with the left child,
where the feature index id = 2. Thus, SCOM([[w2]]pk, [[f2]]pku)
is implemented to output the comparison result. If f2 ≥ w2,
then [[req]]pku is compared with the right child that is a leaf
node. Thus, c1 of the leaf is returned as the prediction result.
After obtaining all predictions from entire encrypted
trees contained in FM, the final diagnosis result [[yˆdia]]pk is
provided as
[[yˆdia]]pk =
1
t
n∗∑
i=1
tj∑
j=1
[[dtj ]]pk([[x]]pk);
s.t. [[dtj ]]pk ∈ FM, t = t1 + t2 + ...+ tn∗ .
(6)
To protect the privacy of DU’s diagnosis result, [[yˆdia]]pk
can only be known to DU. In the step 8©, the diagnosis result
is securely returned according to following operations.
• CP first computes [[yˆdia]]
(1)
pk ← SDecsk(1)([[yˆdia]]pk),
then sends both [[yˆdia]]pk and [[yˆdia]]
(1)
pk to DU.
• On receiving the encrypted result, DU calculates
[[yˆdia]]
(2)
pk ← SDecsk(2)([[yˆdia]]pk) to obtain the de-
cryption share, and then decrypts the final diagnosis
result via yˆdia ← WDec([[yˆdia]](1)pk , [[yˆdia]](2)pk ) that is
only know to DU.
Remarks. SFPA not only provides a more accurate di-
agnosis service by using the privacy-preserving RF-based
federated learning in the ideal world, but also designs an
Algorithm 2: Secure Prediction on Encrypted Tree
Input: Encrypted instance
[[req]]pku = {[[f1]]pku , ..., [[fκ]]pku}, and encrypted
tree [[dt]]pk.
Output: Encrypted prediction result [[yˆ]]pk.
1 Initialize the result [[yˆ]]pk ← Encpk(0);
2 Initialize the feature index id;
3 [[node]]pk ← the tree root of [[dt]]pk;
4 while true do
5 if node is a leaf then
6 Obtain label [[c]]pk of the leaf;
7 return [[yˆ]]pk ← [[c]]pk;
8 else
9 Obtain the weight (id, [[w]]pk) from [[node]]pk;
10 Obtain the selected feature value
[[fid]]pku ∈ [[req]]pku ;
11 Secure comparison SCOM([[fid]]pku , [[w]]pk);
12 if fid < w then
13 [[node]]pk ← [[node]]pk.leftChild;
14 else
15 [[node]]pk ← [[node]]pk.rightChild;
16 return [[yˆ]]pk.
efficient defense countermeasure against poisoning attacks
in the adversarial world. Compared with previous schemes,
our SFPA also supports the multi-key setting. Besides, SFPA
framework can be extended with XGBoost, linear regression
and deep learning techniques.
6 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Here, we define the real vs. ideal model to formalize the
privacy analysis in SFPA. Specifically, assume that an ad-
versary A interacts with a challenger in the real world to
perform the algorithm
∏
, then it interacts with a simulator
S to complete the process in the ideal world. If the view of
A in the real world is indistinguishable from the view of
S in the ideal world, then we consider the algorithm ∏ is
secure, as represented in {IDEALS} c≡ {REALA}, where
the symbol
c≡ means computational indistinguishability.
Besides, we analyze the security of our SFPA system as
follows.
Theorem 1. Our privacy-preserving RF-based federated
learning is secure against semi-honest CP or DIs as long
as multi-key secure computation achieves the security [35],
which can resist the distinguishment of intermediate com-
putation results if there exists no collusion between CP and
DIs.
Proof. In the following, we separately analysis the security
in our federated learning with the above real vs. ideal model.
CP-side Security: During the process of secure
aggregation, the view of ACP is defined as
REALACP = (Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1, Local(1),FM), where
Local = {pk, [[rfi]]pkDIi}ni=1 are encrypted local models,
{sk(1)DIi}ni=1 are secret shares of corresponding {skDIi}ni=1,
and their decryption shares Local(1) = {[[rfi]](1)pkDIi }
n
i=1.
Given the tuple (Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1), we construct the
simulator SCP as follows:
8• CP blinds random numbers to obtain Local′, and
use SDec to get decryption shares Local
′(1)
=
{[[rf ′i ]](1)pkDIi}
n
i=1.
• The i-th DI operates SDec
sk
(2)
DIi
(·) and WDec to get
the corresponding plaintexts pi of Local′ that contain
blinded numbers, then returns FM ← Encpk(·) to
SCP.
Obliviously, the distributions of the real-world
REALACP = (Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1, Local(1),FM) and
the distributions of the ideal-world IDEALSCP =
(Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1,Local
′(1)
,FM) are indistinguishable
due to the semantic security of the proved public-key cryp-
tosystem, as demonstrated in {IDEALSCP}
c≡ {REALACP}.
DI-side Security: Similarly, the view of ADI is de-
fined as REALADI = (Local
′(1), Local′, sk(2)DIi , pi), which
includes the intermediate numbers pi blinded by ran-
dom numbers. Thus, given (Local′(1), Local′, sk(2)DIi) to con-
struct SDI with the above operations. The view of SDI is
IDEALSDI = (Local
′(1), Local′, sk(2)DIi , pi), it is unable to de-
duce any privacy from the intermediate operations due to
blinded random numbers. Therefore, we can conclude that
{IDEALSDI}
c≡ {REALADI}.
Here, the secure aggregation is proved to be secure
against semi-honest adversaries ACP and ADI those can
corrupt CP and DIs in the real world, respectively.
Theorem 2. Our defense countermeasure which deals with
DI-level poisoning attacks is secure against semi-honest DI
or CP on condition that the multi-key secure computation is
secure and there exist no collusion attacks between CP and
DIs.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 1, the specific analysis is demon-
strated as follows.
CP-side Security: During the process of secure de-
fense, the view of ACP is defined as REALACP =
(Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1, Local(1),FM). To implement the Se-
cureMSE and secure defense algorithm, subsequent in-
teractions in secure computation (i.e., SADD, STRA, SCOM,
SMUL) between CP and DIs are involved with multiple
keys. Although CP holds the partial secret shares {sk(1)DIi}ni=1,
sk(1) and each DI holds {sk(2)DIi}ni=1, sk(2), none of them
can obtain the plaintexts as the blinding technique is em-
ployed in the secure computation. The view of SCP is
REALACP = (Local, {sk(1)DIi}ni=1, Local
′(1)
,FM). Obviously, it
is computational indistinguishability, which is represented
as {IDEALSCP}
c≡ {REALACP}.
DI-side Security: Similarly, the distribution of views be-
tween ADI and SDI are also identical, which are shown as
{IDEALSDI}
c≡ {REALADI}.
For more proof details, please refer to the reference [35].
Both the adversary ACP corrupting CP and the adversary
ADI corrupting DIs are unable to distinguish the ideal world
from the real world.
Theorem 3. Our pocket diagnosis is secure against semi-
honest CP or DU on condition that the multi-key secure
computation can realize the distinguishment of intermediate
computation results and there exist no collusion attacks
between CP and DIs.
Proof. The specific analysis is shown as follows.
CP-side Security: During the process of pocket di-
agnosis, the view of ACP is defines as REALACP =
([[req]]pku , sk
(1)
u ,FM), where [[req]]pku represents an en-
crypted request sent by DU for diagnosis service,
sk
(1)
u denotes DU’s corresponding secret share. Given
([[req]]pku , sk
(1)
u ,FM), we adopt multi-key secure computa-
tion to construct the simulator SCP, the process interacts
with DU and provides the proved privacy protection [35].
Therefore, it is impossible to infer the private information,
the distribution of views between REALACP and IDEALSCP
is indistinguishable, as represented in {IDEALSCP}
c≡
{REALACP}.
DU-side Security: In addition, the returned diagnosis
result [[yˆdia]]
(2)
pk is encrypted under public key pk, it is
worth noticing that DU holds the secret share sk(2) to
decrypt the final diagnosis results. Even if the adversary
steals the federated model, it still cannot use it without
the corresponding secret key sk(2). Thus, we conclude that
{IDEALSDU}
c≡ {REALADU}.
Therefore, both the adversaryACP corrupting CP and the
adversary ADU corrupting DU in the real world are unable
to distinguish.
To guarantee the security of the SFPA system, the mali-
cious adversaries cannot distinguish encrypted information
from the other encrypted data without the corresponding
secret keys. Therefore, SFPA system can resist privacy leak-
age with the above theorems.
7 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first clarify two real-world datasets and
the experiment setup, then evaluate the performance of
SFPA by comparing it with other typical privacy-preserving
RF-based machine learning schemes [36]. Finally, we vali-
date the effectiveness of the secure defense against DI-level
poisoning attacks.
7.1 Dataset and Experiment Setup
We perform our evaluation on two public datasets:
(a) Heart disease dataset4 includes 303 instances, 14
features as well as two labels, where a patient with-
out heart disease is labeled as “-1”, a patient suffers
from heart disease “1”.
(b) Thyroid disease dataset5 contains 3,163 instances,
18 features and two labels, where a patient without
thyroid disease is annotated as “-1”, a patient with
thyroid disease is annotated as “1”.
We use the cross-validation method to split training
datasets into the training set ( 23 ), validation and testing set
( 13 ), heart disease dataset (abbr., Dtra ) is divided into 3 sub-
datasets and thyroid disease dataset (abbr., Dtrb ) is divided
into 10 sub-datasets for federated learning, where the size
4. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Heart+Disease
5. http://www.kaggle.com/kumar012/hypothyroid
9(a) Feature distribution of 3 sub-
datasets belonging to Dtra .
(b) Feature distribution of 10 sub-
datasets belonging to Dtrb .
Fig. 7: Non-i.i.d distribution of training datasets.
of each sub-dataset is 100 samples. In Figs. 7(a)(b), it shows
that Standard Deviation (StdDev) of each feature contained
in all sub-datasets of Dtra and Dtrb , respectively, where
StdDev is denoted as the degree of dispersion of samples
in a dataset. As presented as Figs. 7(a)(b), we discover that
the non-i.i.d. distribution of all sub-datasets of Dtra and
Dtrb , as there are bias in the feature distributions among
sub-datasets.
In our experiments, we choose |N | = 1024 bits in
the multi-key decryption scheme shown in Section 3.2 to
achieve 80-bit security level. Besides, we implemented our
SFPA in Java, the experiments are evaluated on the cloud
platform (25 VMs from the GRNET Okeanos public cloud6
with the following characteristics per VM: 1 VCPU, 1 GB
RAM, 10 GB Disk, Ubuntu Server 12.04.4 LTS).
7.2 Performance of Privacy-preserving RF-based Fed-
erated Learning
In the experiment, we first plot the setting of federated
learning with 3 DIs in the ideal world. Since the tree number
t is an important factor in each RF, we achieve a tradeoff
between effectiveness and efficiency by choosing different
values of t.
(a) Federated learning
(3 DIs, Dtra ).
(b) Federated learning
(3 DIs, Dtrb ).
(c) Secure aggregation
(3 DIs, Dtra ).
Fig. 8: Performance of SFPA. (a)(b) are the accuracy of the
proposed federated learning varying with tree number t,
where 3 DIs and 10 DIs, respectively. (c) is the running time
of secure aggregation varying with t, where 3 DIs.
7.2.1 Effectiveness Analysis
As discussed in Figs. 8(a)(b), we observe that the greater
the value of t is, the higher accuracy outputs. Besides, the
6. https://okeanos.grnet.gr/
accuracy increases slowly and remains stable over Dtra
when t > 30, and the accuracy is 85.6% when t = 30.
Fig. 8(b) shows that the accuracy slowly increases remains
stable over Dtrb when t > 5, and the accuracy is 97.5%
when t = 5. In Fig. 8(c), we notice that the running time
of secure aggregation has approximately linear growth with
the tree number t overDtra . This is because with the growth
of tree number, more trees are required to be aggregated.
Thus, it needs more STRA involved to implement secure
aggregation. Considering both efficiency and accuracy, we
respectively set t = 30 of Dtra , and t = 5 of Dtrb in the
following experiments.
7.2.2 Efficiency Analysis
Then, we evaluate the efficiency in our implementation over
the training dataset Dtra :
• DI-side processing: It costs 0.110 s for locally training
in each DI, where each DI adopts a RF model that
consists of 30 trees.
• CP-side processing: It costs 9.84 s for secure aggrega-
tion in our federated learning.
7.2.3 Comparison Analysis
A comparison of both computational overhead (abbr.,
Comp.) and communication overhead (abbr., Comm.)
among our proposed federated learning, Ma et al. [36], and
Aono et al. [18] is conducted in TABLE 3. Both [36], [18] are
based on Paillier cryptosystem (|N | = 1024 bits). In [18],
the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model consists
of two convolution layers and two fully connected layers
with 128 neurons each layer, the activation function is ReLU
function. As plotted in TABLE 3, the comparison analysis is
shown in the following.
(a) Comparison between [36] and
SFPA (3 DIs, Dtra , t = 1).
(b) Comparison between [18] and
SFPA (3 DIs, Dtrb , t = 5).
Fig. 9: Comparison analysis of SFPA.
Compared with privacy-preserving data-outsourced
random forest scheme [36], we discover that our scheme has
a significant improvement of training time and a negligible
decrease of communication overhead. The reason is that our
method implements local training over plaintexts instead of
running over ciphertexts, which obviously reduces cipher-
text operations to improve efficiency.
In the actual dataset Dtra , we set the tree number t = 1
to run our federated learning and [36]. As demonstrated in
Fig. 9(a), the training time is 11.831 s in our method while
the time is 1.88 × 105 s in [36], and the accuracy is 79.3%
in our method while 79.2% in [36]. Hence, we can conclude
that our method brings in an obvious increase of efficiency
without a decrease in accuracy.
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Compared with privacy-preserving federated learning
based on deep learning [18], we discover that SFPA has
a significant improvement of training time and communi-
cation overhead. As a CNN model contains hundreds of
neurons in [18], which not only costs a lot of computational
overhead to implement homomorphic addition operations,
but also burdens the communication overhead in transmit-
ted CNN models between CP and a DI.
In the actual dataset Dtrb , we set the tree number t = 5
and 3 DIs to run SFPA and [18]. As demonstrated in
Fig. 9(b), the training time is 61.317 s in our method while
the time is 3.4 hours in [18], and the accuracy is 95.7% in
our method while 81.8% in [18]. Hence, we can conclude
that SFPA brings in an obvious increase in accuracy, since
the excellent prediction of random forest over textual data.
Besides, the obvious improvement of efficiency is because
that compared with a large number of neurons contained in
a CNN model of [18], a random forest is a lightweight model
contained tens of tree nodes, which can significantly im-
prove computational overhead as fewer nodes are involved
in secure aggregation.
7.3 Performance of Secure Defense and Pocket Diag-
nosis
We perform the proposed secure defense on DI-level poi-
soning attacks. Meanwhile, the proposed federated learning
is also constructed in the adversarial world. In order to
compare the effectiveness of the secure defense, we plot the
adversarial setting of federated learning with 3 sub-datasets
belonging to Dtra under the setting of 3 DIs, where the
poisoning rate is set as α = 1/3 (i.e., one poisoned DI×)
and α = 2/3 (i.e., two poisoned DIs×), and the adversarial
setting of federated learning with 10 sub-datasets belonging
to Dtrb under the setting of 10 DIs, where the poisoning
rate is set as α ∈ (0, 1), respectively. To deploy the DI-level
attack, we randomly clone the fraction β7 (0 < β < 1)
of the local training data of DI× and flip their labels [38]
as the attacker’s carefully crafted poisonous data injected
into DI×’s training data. It is worth noticing that the new
label y× of each poisonous data is obtained by y× = 0 − y,
where y ∈ [−1, 1] is the original data label. We vary the
fraction β of DI× from 0.1 to 0.9 with intervals of 0.2 for
implementation of DI-level poisoning attack.
7.3.1 Effectiveness Analysis
To observe the impact of DI-level poisoning attacks on the
federated model over Dtra under the setting of α = 1/3
and α = 2/3, we first implement the proposed federated
learning over 3 DIs without secure defense. According to
the MSE of DI-level poisoning attack shown in Fig. 10(a),
we highlight several interesting observations. First, β has
a positive impact on poisoning the local RF. The larger the
value of β is, the greater MSE products (the lower accuracy
local poisoned RF model trains). Second, with the greater
α, the bigger MSE outputs. Hence, α also has an important
effect on the DI-level poisoning attack.
In the experiments presented below, we evaluate the
newly proposed secure defense in our SFPA. The accuracy
7. To avoid the detection of DI, the attack injects malicious samples
within a limited time, thus the fraction β is difficult to reach 1.
of the DI-level poisoning attack varying with different frac-
tion of poisonous data is compared with that of secure
defense in Figs. 10(b)-(e). As plotted in Figs. 10(b)(c), our
secure defense countermeasure can efficiently resist the data
poisoning-level attack over the training dataset Dtra , which
has a significant improvement compared with the proposed
federated learning without defense when α = 1/3 and
α = 2/3, and works well in the stable accuracy range (83%-
84.5%). Besides, the accuracy of SFPA with secure defense
does not be influenced by the α.
As plotted in Fig. 10(d), we discover that the accuracy
of our proposed federated learning is going down over the
training dataset Dtrb with the growth of α and the increase
of the fraction of poisoned data. As plotted in Fig. 10(e),
we discover that our secure defense countermeasure can
efficiently resist the data poisoning-level attack over Dtrb
compared with Fig. 10(d) within the stable accuracy range
(84.3%-97.4%). Besides, in Fig. 10(f), we introduce “recall”
to measure the federated model’s capability of classifying
positive samples, and employs “specificity” to measure the
federated model’s capability of classifying negative sam-
ples. When β = 0.9 and α = 1/3, the recall, specificity
and accuracy have obvious improvement in secure defense
over training data Dtra when compared with the federated
learning without defense.
7.3.2 Efficiency Analysis
As demonstrated in Figs. 10(g)(h), we evaluate the com-
putation cost of the proposed secure defense over training
dataset Dtra with setting α = 1/3 by varying two main
factors, namely tree number t and the size of validation
dataset |Dval|.
CP-side processing: As demonstrated in Fig. 10(g), we
discover that the running time of secure defense linearly
increases with varying the number of validation dataset
|Dval| from 50 to 200. This is the fact that the larger number
of validation data brings in more computation costs caused
by calling SecureMSE algorithm. Besides, from Fig. 10(h),
we observe that the running time increases when changing
the tree number t from 10 to 50. This is because more
encrypted trees are involved in the process of SecureMSE,
which leads to more secure predictions on an encrypted tree.
From the above figures, we discover that the running time
of secure defense linearly increases with tree number and
the size of validation dataset.
When |Dval| = 100, β = 0.5 and t = 30, for the
CP-side processing, secure defense costs 1793.3 s and the
accuracy of pocket diagnosis is stable as 84.5% (recall =
86.8%, specificity = 82.0%). For the DU-side processing, an
authorized DU can make a pocket diagnosis in 5.84 s except
for the communication overhead.
7.4 Cost Analysis
Furthermore, we analyze the complexities in SFPA system,
the computational overhead and communication overhead
are detailedly listed in TABLE 4.
• DI-side processing: During the process of initialization,
it involves ModelBuild and ModelEnc, and costs the
total time complexity as O(t2hTEnc) for local training
over multiple DIs.
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(a) 3 DIs, t = 30, Dtra . (b) 3 DIs, t = 30, α = 1/3, Dtra . (c) 3 DIs, t = 30, α = 2/3, Dtra . (d) Accuracy with different poison-
ing attacks, 10 DIs, t = 5, Dtrb .
(e) Accuracy with defense strategy,
10 DIs, t = 5, Dtrb .
(f) β = 0.9, α = 1/3, Dtra . (g) t = 30, α = 1/3, Dtra . (h) |Dval|=100, α = 1/3, Dtra .
Fig. 10: Performance of secure defense countermeasure. (a) is the MSE of DI-level poisoning attack with different fraction,
where 3 DIs and t = 30. (b)(c) are the comparison of accuracy between secure defense and the proposed federated learning
without defense, where the α = 1/3 and α = 2/3, respectively. (d) is the accuracy of different α and different fraction
of poisoned data. (e) is the accuracy of secure defense with different α and different fraction of poisoned data. (f) is the
comparison between secure defense and without defense, where β = 0.9 and α = 1/3. (g)(h) are running time of secure
defense in different situations.
TABLE 3: Comparison between our federated learning and [36], [18]
Phase Our framework Ma et al. [36] Aono et al. [18]
Comp. Init. |Dtr|vh+ n(2
h − 1)TEnc |Dtr|TEnc |Neurons|TEnc
Training nt(2h − 1)TSTAR t(2h − 1)Ttotal n|Neurons|TAdd
Comm. Init. nt(2
h − 1)= |Dtr|= |Neurons|=
Training 3n(2h − 1)= 3t(2h − 1)(1 + 2 + 3)= –
Notes. |Dtr| is the total number of training data hosted over all DIs, = is the bit length of an encrypted number, v is the number of features, h is the height of
a tree, n is the total number of DIs. TEnc and TSTRA denote the time for Enc and STRA, respectively. Besides, Ttotal = 1TEnc + 2TAdd + 3TMul are the total
computation overhead of secure computation in [36], where TAdd, TMul are the time for homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication and 1, 2, 3
are operation times of Enc, homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication in [36], respectively. |Neurons| denotes the number of neurons of a CNN
in [18]. “–” means no communication overhead is required in training process of [18], as the whole process is based on additive homomorphic.
TABLE 4: Computational overhead and communication
overhead
Phase Computational Overhead Communication Overhead
ModelBuild O(vh|Dtr|) O(nt2h=)
ModelEnc O(nt2hTEnc)
SecureMSE O(nth|Dval|TSCOM) O(3nt2h=|Dval|)
SecureAggregation O(n∗t2hTSTRA) O(3n∗t2h=)
SecurePrediction O(n∗thTSCOM) O(3n∗th=)
Notes.= is the bit length of an encrypted number, |Dtr| is the total number of
training data hosted over all DIs, v is the number of features, h is the height of
a tree, n is the total number of DIs, and n∗ is the number of chosen RF models
for federated model. TEnc, TSCOM and TSTRA denote the time for Enc, SCOM and
STRA, respectively.
• CP-side processing: During the process of
secure defense, it involves SecureMSE and
SecureAggregation, and spends the total time
complexity as O(nth|Dval|TSCOM + n∗t2hTSTRA) to
construct the federated model.
• DU-side processing: For the diagnosis phase, it in-
volves SecurePrediction to make a diagnosis for a
DU’s encrypted request, which costs O(n∗thTSCOM)
for a diagnosis.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed the privacy-preserving random
forest-based federated learning with secure defense against
DI-level poisoning attacks, which can achieve real-time and
accurate pocket diagnosis. According to multi-key secure
computation, the proposed SFPA could not only securely
construct federated learning based on random forest, but
also efficiently defense poisoning attacks without compris-
ing the availability of the federated model. Experimental
results over real-world datasets verified the efficiency and
security of the SFPA in the federated learning setting.
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